The Kaiser and Churchill

"One day President Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be called. I said at once "the unnecessary war". but then he goes on, "There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle." - an obvious reference to the lack of success of the First World War, hardly the glowing endorsement one might have expected, - even a hint perhaps that (at least for we of British stock) World War One was not necessary either, - which is the theme of this talk!

Now when we look carefully at Churchill's writings, we find many such insightful revelations, 'though these are often interspersed with less insightful enthusiastic passages about the necessity of, plus all sorts of exciting details about preparations for war, as occurred in the case of the First World War.

Well today, when we're allowing our Western, self-proclaimed Christian leaders to take us, and more to the point our children and grandchildren into more and more bizarrely unnecessary wars, it seems a good idea to look into the origins and consequences of the wars we were involved in last century and, - taking Britain and Australia's involvement in WW1 as a case history, - ask whether it was morally justified?, was it necessary for our common survival, for example? Or was it, rather, that the outcome for Britain, along with Australia - and all of the nations initially involved, - such that all would have been far, far better off without it, that this war (like just so many others) was totally counter-productive?

Like me, you may feel the answer is all too obvious, but still I think its valuable to hear the judgement of some of that war's lead players at different stages of their political careers. For example, in his maiden speech to the House of Commons in 1901, the 26-year-old Winston Churchill had the following to say about the counter-productivity of any future war between Europe's industrial powers, and I quote: "We must not regard war with a modern Power as a kind of game in which we may take a hand, and with good luck may come safe home with our winnings. It is not that, and I rejoice that it cannot be that."

"A European war cannot be anything but a cruel, heartrending struggle, which, if we are ever to enjoy the fruits of victory, a little ambivalence creeping in there, I think! must demand, perhaps for several years, the whole manhood of the nation, the entire suspension of peaceful industries, and the concentrating to one end of every vital energy in the community..."

"I have frequently been astonished since I have been in this House to hear with what composure and how glibly Members and even Ministers, talk of a European war..." And now follows the guts of his warning: "But now, when mighty populations are impelled on each other... when the resources of science and civilisation sweep away everything that might mitigate their fury, a European war can only end in the ruin of the vanquished and the scarcely less fatal commercial dislocation of the conquerors... We do not know what war is. We have had a glimpse of it in South Africa. Even in miniature it is hideous and appalling." (MG1, 51-2)

Remarkable, yes, both for its authorship and its very clear insight as to what would be that wars utter counter-productivity to all of the nations participating - Britain, for example, never being the same again.

Moreover, considering the inevitability of such an outcome in that industrial age, why was that insight not shared by all the Imperial powers?!

Well, at leadership level, it appears that all were mesmerised by the lure of never-ending economic growth, expanding wealth and power, - which meant ever-greater expansion Colonially to the detriment of others, - ultimately these others to include their Empire competitors. Competition was the watchword, Social Darwinism was in the air. (JH; MH; AN; BT1; BT2)

So, as this line of thinking went, just like the survival of the fittest individuals, the fittest nations, the fittest Empires could only survive, would reach their zeniths, their 'manifest destinies', only through what United States' Admiral Mahan termed 'honest collision' in the field of war, with their Imperial rivals. (BT1, 249-50)

And let there be no illusions as to the very real threat of war at this very time. For as George F. Kennan, historian and former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union (see http://www.answers.com/topic/george-f-kennan) wrote, ever since what he termed the 'Fateful Alliance 'of 1892/4, between France and Russia, whereby these two committed themselves to "Immediate and simultaneous mobilisation" whenever any component of the Triple Alliance should mobilise, (as later occurred following Austria's partial mobilisation against Serbia in 1914) Europe had stood teetering on the very edge of general war. (GK, 238-258; http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/franruss.html)

Fashoda

Indeed, there followed a number of international 'incidents', including the 1898 crisis between Britain and France, - over the arrival of a rather small French military mission at Fashoda on the Upper Nile, - which went very close to war. (BT1, 57, 231, 255) And yet, as Barbara Tuchman so well describes in her account of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, - which had called for agreements on arms limitation and negotiation to deal with such crises, - the response of Europe's Powers was utter disdain, total rejection! (BT1, 227-288)

OK, but why would Britain's Parliamentarians want to engage in 'glib talk' of a European war between competing Empires? After all, by 1901 the British Empire was the greatest of all, controlling over 13 million square miles of foreign territory along with some 366 million of its inhabitants, (JH, 20) - added to which Britain itself, as an island state girt by sea and protected by the world's strongest navy, could feel totally secure regardless of what struggles might occur across Europe.

However, the reality was that by the late 1800s (indeed from about 1884) Britain's competitive economic position was on the decline, it being challenged by the more rapidly-developing economies of the US, Japan and Germany, - added to which these powers (and others), by laying claim to various bits of China and other parts of the globe, were simply ignoring Lord Salisbury's plea that they respect the status quo, - i.e., what Great Britain laid claim to. (KW1, 158-60)

It was all of great concern to those in the know. As Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, wrote to Lord Curzon on October 11, 1900, "Unless we are prepared to... throw in our lot with some of the great European Powers we cannot expect them to stand in with us in protecting our own interests". Indeed, as he emphasised to Curzon the following year, "As we now stand, we are an object of envy and of greed to all the other Powers. Our interests are so vast and ramified that we touch, in some shape or other, the interests of almost every great country in every continent." And that, he said, made it impossible, "...to deter foreign nations from trying to encroach upon our interests...". (KW1, 160)

OK, well that explained Britain's Imperial position, that of its Conservatives under Salisbury - including their desire for 'Allies', - such leading to Treaties and other 'arrangements' (shall we say), which could, indeed, involve Britain in a European war.

Now although I'll be emphasising the strong opposition to this approach within Britain's Liberal Party, I need here to outline the Conservative's early moves to gather useful 'Allies' and some 'downside' consequences. First, bearing in mind Britain's principal adversaries, its centuries-long enemy, France and the currently more-pressing Czarist Russia, Britain's initial move was to make a full military alliance with the ever-so fast-developing Japan, through its Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902.

As an interesting aside, I should quote Churchill on its historical background, - his reflections on Japan's meteoric rise to power from the 1850s, this taken from 'The Grand Alliance' the third volume of his Second World War series. (WC5)

On Japan's forced awakening by the West, Churchill has this to say: "Uncle Sam and Brittania were the god-parents of the new Japan. In less than two generations, with no background but the remote past, the Japanese people advanced from the two-handed sword of the Samurai to the ironclad ship, the rifled cannon, the torpedo, and the Maxim gun; and a similar revolution took place in industry. The transition of Japan under British and American guidance from the Middle Ages to modern times was swift and violent." (WC5, 515)

Churchill then goes on to comment on Japan's earlier assaults on China, its 1904/5 defeat of Russia, and how Japan "...took her place amongst the Great Powers", and then how the Japanese leaders were "...astonished at the respect with which they were viewed." He further admits how he had sided with them in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904; that he had welcomed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1902; and 1904 - to 1921) and how he 'rejoiced' when Japan, joining the Allies during WWI, took over Germany's 'possessions' in the Far East, China's port of Kiao Chow, and 4 Pacific island groups: (Palau, the Marianas, the Carolines and the Marshalls) (WC5, 516; MG1, 333-4) Well, it certainly was a fast learning time for these Japanese 'modernisers', those artful imitators of the West!

Yet, despite these wonderfully insightful revelations, instead of drawing the obvious conclusion that Japan was simply emulating, ever too 'successfully', the behaviour of the Western Powers, he then goes to much trouble to show how 'different' they were, how one has to struggle to understand "...the Japanese mind. It was indeed inscrutable.". For example, rather than interpret the tensions that developed between the First and Second World Wars, as a growing disagreement between Great Powers as to who should get what of colonial spoils in the Far East, Churchill sought to explain such disagreements in terms of these 'differences' - of the Japanese mind and thus, by implication, of Japanese militarism. (WC5, 516-8)

Of course, while we might doubt the wisdom of The West having thus awakened Japan, yet at the time its Conservative promoters truly appreciated its negative effects on both Russia and France. Indeed, as Churchill related in "The World Crisis" (his history of the origins and course of WW1), despite concerns about the growing economy of Germany, "She was invited to join with us in the Alliance with Japan." (WC2, 21) Hard to believe, - and how different our history might have been!

However, as events transpired, Germany declined and, instead, Britain came soon to recognise that its differences with France and Russia were not insuperable after all! So, in Churchill's words, "...Initially that meant from 1902 cultivating good relations with France.." (WC2, 21) a process which advanced rapidly once France sensed her weakened position following her Ally, Russia's, defeat by Japan in 1904.

And as he went on to explain, what emerged was the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 in which "...the essence of the compact was that the French desisted from opposition to British interests in Egypt, and Britain gave general support to the French views about Morocco" (WC2, 22) Truly a gentleman's agreement, and what marvelous language to describe a compact between competing Empires which so easily delineates their respective powers over other countries, other peoples. And what a tragic outcome that rapprochement would ultimately have, one alluded to by Lord Rosebury who at the time commented: "My mournful and supreme conviction is that this agreement is much more likely to lead to complications than to peace." (WC2, 22) Again, like Churchill's Maiden Speech of 1901, very insightful, yet sadly to no avail!

Now aside from the injustices to the people of those countries that had just been bargained away, what was the problem for Britain, France and the rest of Europe in all this? Well important background is the 1880 Treaty of Madrid entered into by Europe's powers, this guaranteeing Morocco's independence and open trade access to all those Treaty nations, - whereas France's clear intention was to bag Morocco as its exclusive preserve.

As described by Churchill, "Early in 1905 a French mission arrived in Fez. Their language and actions seemed to show an intention of treating Morocco as a French Protectorate, thereby ignoring the international obligations of the Treaty of Madrid. The Sultan of Morocco appealed to Germany, asking if France was authorised in the name of Europe." (WC2, 31) Germany succeeded in calling an international conference of the Treaty's signatories (at Algeciras) and despite Churchill's judgement that, "France had not a good case", Britain sided with France. And yet, although ultimately the conference supported the principle of open trade access, Germany was as Churchill put it "effectively isolated." More than that, he added, had the crisis come to war, "...Great Britain could not remain indifferent". (WC2, 32)

And, emphasizing what this would mean if any future crisis led to war between France and Germany, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, incoming Liberal British Prime Minister instituted what were termed "military conversations" between the British and French General Staffs "...with a view to concerted action in the event of war." (WC2, 32) Looking back from 1927, Churchill commented, "This was a step of profound significance and of far-reaching reactions.," - he going on to proclaim that, "The attitude of Great Britain at Algeciras turned the scale against Germany." Yet, precisely because, as he so rightly added, "Algeciras was a milestone on the road to Armageddon" (WC2, 32-3) the greater reality was that the scale was turned against all of the prime combatant countries of WW1 since, in both human and economic terms, all engulfed in that tragedy, (including Britain and Australia) became the losers.

However, going back to the days of the Liberal Party's accession to government in 1906, there seemed to be distinct indications of hope because that party was dominated by the self-proclaimed 'Liberal Radicals' who, while they favoured progressive social reforms at home, were utterly opposed to military adventures abroad. Now, one of these Radicals, Winston Churchill, although originally a Conservative, had transferred in 1904 to the Liberals where he began a close collaboration with the Liberal Radical David Lloyd George. And there Winston's insights on both social policy and foreign affairs are so remarkable I just have to quote from his 1909 speech titled, "The Spirit of the Budget", given in Leicester on September 5 that year, then (along with other speeches) published in book form, as "Liberalism and the Social Problem" available online via the Gutenberg Project. (see WC1 under 'Spirit of the Budget', 357)

Here's a slab of it: "The social conditions of the British people in the early years of the twentieth century cannot be contemplated without deep anxiety. ...We are at the cross-ways. If we stand on in the old happy- go-lucky way, the richer classes ever growing in wealth and in number, and ever declining in responsibility, the very poor remaining plunged or plunging even deeper into helpless, hopeless misery, then I think there is nothing before us but savage strife between class and class..."

"Now we have had over here lately colonial editors from all the Colonies of the British Empire, and what is the opinion which they expressed as to the worst thing they saw in the old country? ...Is it not impressive to find that they are all agreed, coming as they do from Australia, or Canada, or South Africa, or New Zealand, that the greatest danger to the British Empire and to the British people is not to be found among the enormous fleets and armies of the European Continent, nor in the solemn problems of Hindustan; it is not the Yellow peril nor the Black peril nor any danger in the wide circuit of colonial and foreign affairs."

"No, it is here in our midst, ...in the vast growing cities of England and Scotland, and in the dwindling and cramped villages of our denuded countryside. It is there you will find the seeds of Imperial ruin and national decay - the unnatural gap between rich and poor, the divorce of the people from the land, ...the exploitation of boy labour, the physical degeneration which seems to follow so swiftly on civilized poverty, the awful jumbles of an obsolete Poor Law, ...the absence of any established minimum standard of life and comfort among the workers, and, at the other end, the swift increase of vulgar, joyless luxury - here are the enemies of Britain. Beware lest they shatter the foundations of her power."

Quite extraordinary stuff, for I doubt you'd have guessed its authorship. Moreover, considering that the Liberals were not only in power then, but remained so through to the very eve of Britain's declaration of war in 1914, - and that the Liberal Imperialists in the Cabinet were vastly outnumbered by the Liberal Radicals, who were absolutely determined not to become embroiled in any European conflict, - one might have expected that Britain's Liberal government could not only have saved Britain's youth and wealth, but by its good example and other diplomatic measures, might even have saved the youth and wealth of Continental Europe as well.

So why did this not occur? And how might it have turned out more happily? - obviously a tale of relevance for our less-than-sane, 'crazy mixed up world' of today.

Well, one vital factor was that among the minority Imperialists in Cabinet, were those 3 or 4 key players, principally Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, and, third, Britain's aptly-named Minister for War, Richard Haldane who were highly motivated to pursue the policy the Liberals had inherited from the Conservatives at the time of the first Moroccan crisis of 1905/6, -- namely to continue with the secret military contingency planning that was very likely to involve Britain in war, - namely, to support France at any time it might be at war with Germany. (KW2; WC2, 32-4; GK; WW1Docs; BT1))

Indeed, those contingency plans, inherited by Campbell-Bannerman in 1906 were strengthened once Asquith succeeded him in 1908, at which time Lloyd George became Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Churchill joined Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade, these two then (seemingly) firmly in the ranks of the Liberal Radicals, - cooperating to advance social justice at home, and determined to oppose involvement in any European war. (WC2, 33-4)

Panther Gunpoint

Now, we do not know just when Churchill's views on the wisdom of such involvement turned around, but its clear that by the second Moroccan crisis of 1911 (triggered by another French 'expedition' occupying its capital Fez followed by Germany's response, an attempt to set up a trading post on the Atlantic coast at Agadir), Churchill, by then in the Imperialist camp, was encouraging Lloyd George to likewise declare himself. (WC2, 46-7)

And so it came to pass that, thus encouraged, Lloyd George agreed to present his 'Mansion House' speech, one drafted by Asquith and Grey, that gives one the clear impression of an Empire more than a little anxious as to its declining position, - at one point Lloyd George saying, "I believe it is essential in the highest interests not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world." That beginning a long passage which ends by proclaiming, "I would make great sacrifices to maintain peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international goodwill except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests are vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." (WC2, 47) So you see what I mean. And, indeed, according to Churchill, it was a message that set off alarm bells across Europe! (WC2, 46-50)

Yet, notwithstanding Lloyd George's shift of position, I should emphasise the ongoing strength of the opposition across the Liberal Cabinet to this line of thinking. That opposition was led by Lord Morley, John Viscount Morley, a seasoned parliamentary veteran who in the mid 1880s had strived with Gladstone to introduce the first Irish Home Rule Bill and other enlightened measures. With his ideals and ambitions uncorrupted, he could clearly see that, inevitably, a general European war would, in human and economic terms, be mutually tragic, absolutely catastrophic for all combatant nations involved. Moreover, as he realised, far from maintaining Britain's predominant position in the world, such a war could only undermine it. (KW2, 232)

And Morley's views were backed by an overwhelming majority of the Cabinet (indeed 15 to 5) such that when various covert activities of the Liberal Imperial faction were uncovered during this 1911 crisis, that majority insisted on a full Cabinet debate, - this resulting in a show-down and clarifying 'note' (dated November 29, 1911) which appeared to be decisive. Agreed to by all, its 3 points stated:

And as Churchill went on, "Naval rivalry had at the moment ceased to be a cause of friction. We were proceeding inflexibly for the third year in succession with our series of programmes according to scale and declaration. Germany had made no further increases in naval power since the beginning of 1912. It was certain that we could not be overtaken as far as capital ships were concerned." (WC2, 179, & see also 244-7).

However, it took eminent British historian G. P. Gooch to see the effect of the prior excessive arms build-up in its proper context. As Gooch emphasised, "The Old World had degenerated into a powder magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a conflagration ... It is a mistake to imagine that the conflict of 1914 took Europe unawares, for the statesmen and soldiers had been expecting it and preparing for it for many years." (GG, 559; see also GK, BT2 & IB,Essay 3, B(b)(c))