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This is the fourth of the volumes of the author's memoires and is partly an
account of the author's private life, including the period during which he
met and married his wife, and gives his impressions of the many people he
met. Perhaps half of the book has this personal focus, set against the
backdrop of the distinctive air-conditioned 'cocoon' which was life at
Government House in Aden. This reviewer had some exposure to that in the
early 1960s.
Aden was very different from most colonies in that it was also the busy locus
of the Headquarters of the British Middle East Command (MECOM), with a
complex inter-service command and control structure, senior officers of all
three services, and associated specialised functions such as a Political Office,
intelligence staff, large stores, fuel and explosive depots, an Aden Garrison
command, operational units - several battalions of the army and the Royal
Marines, several squadrons of the Air Force and various naval facilities. There
was also a High Commission office providing policy advice and support
services to the High Commissioner, which included a few Foreign Office
personnel anticipating the eventual conversion of the office into an embassy,
and bringing expertise and knowledge from around the Arab world.
Aden was one of the busiest seaports in the world with a constant flow of
ships in and out, including many passenger liners at a time when travel by sea
was still normal, and travel by air a much smaller operation than today. There
was much movement of both civilian and service personnel in and out of the
Colony and anyone posted there was by no means isolated, as was the case
in the district offices of the typical colony, and indeed in the up-country posts in
the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates.
In his position of Private Secretary to Sir Richard Turnbull, High Commissioner
for Aden and South Arabia, Eberlie came into contact with the whole spectrum
of people with whom the High Commissioner had official business, as well as those attending official or private events at Government House. As a
consequence he came to know many of those engaged in running the country,
both Arab and non-Arab. Within Aden Colony itself there was a Government
comprising a Legislative Assembly, a Secretariat with various administrative,
legal and other functions, ministries discharging technical functions, political
parties and an active trade union movement. The Colony had since 1963
become a part of the nascent Federation of South Arabia, though its
membership had only limited support within the Colony itself. The Federal
Government was based at Al Ittihad, across the harbour from Steamer Point. It
was intended that this would evolve into the State and government to which
responsibility could be transferred at independence.
Within the Western Aden Protectorate, the British staff were seeking to foster
the operation of the Federation in the 15 small states lying between Yemen to
the north and the Indian Ocean. Within the Eastern Aden Protectorate, the
British staff sought to strengthen the three larger and more remote states
located there (Quaiti, Kathiri and Mahra) while they pondered the best way to
approach independence - they were steadfastly opposed to joining the
Federation.
Eberlie helped to facilitate an increasingly hectic series of consultations and
negotiations under the leadership of Sir Richard Turnbull, addressing the local
political and constitutional situation and the search for an amicable agreement
for the future of the country. From 1963 onwards (especially during the period
of Eberlie's service there) local opposition increased with international support;
violence also increased steadily Latterly there was also much internal
violence among the various contenders for power after independence. Apart
from civil opposition among Aden politicians and the Trade Unions, these
contenders included proscribed organisations operating outside the law, of
which the National Liberation Front proved to be the most violent and effective
in seizing power.
One insight Eberlie brings, of which officers on the ground may have been
less aware than he was, is the extent to which the High Commissioner was
constrained by policies and instructions emanating from HMG in London -
more so than Turnbull had been used to when he was Governor of
Tanganyika. This became inevitable when the decision was taken to close
down the military base in Aden and the Foreign Office took over from the
Colonial Office as the responsible ministry. Eberlie mentions no less than
seven ministerial visits to Aden during his period in Aden, and numerous
command-level military visitors. In addition Turnbull paid numerous visits to
London.
Gradually, the increasing insecurity became the overwhelming preoccupation
of the High Commissioner, the administration, and by 1965 of the armed
forces too. Emergency powers were used, but they were in vain. Eberlie
describes his increasingly frequent and depressing attendance, in a personal
or official capacity, at funerals at the British cemetery in Silent Valley, Little
Aden, of local civil servants, police officers, soldiers, civil officers posted from
London and members of the public who had been killed, who included several
of his colleagues and friends. Even children on holiday became casualties.
This preoccupation with security frustrated all negotiations about the future of
the country and increasingly the way in which the future of MECOM and the
military base were perceived by the British Government. This has all been
described and analysed elsewhere.
Eberlie reports on these developments but appears not to have been aware of
the background to the Federation. In particular, he does not indicate that he
was aware of the 1958 correspondence between Sir William Luce, when
Governor of Aden, and the British Government in which Luce advised a
radically different approach to the future of Aden, more in keeping, he
asserted, "with modern trends and the realities of the situation". He had
envisaged first a simple association of Colony and Protectorate on practical
matters of government; second a firm constitutional arrangement for merger,
the whole (including Aden Colony) to have protected status in treaty
relationship with Britain, with provision for continuance of the military base;
finally, independence of the new state within less than ten years. In making
these proposals Luce forecast almost exactly what in the event did happen if
measures such as these were not accepted. After prolonged consideration,
HMG rejected Luce's proposals, largely to accommodate the Ministry of
Defence which sought firm control of the land where its facilities would be
situated. Doubtless Luce's proposals would have been hard argued also, but
they did hold out the promise of a State with Aden at its core, giving
nationalists something to aim for, as Malaya had done earlier. It might even
have attracted the Eastern states to join it.
After the 1966 General Election, which it won, the Labour Government
transferred responsibility for Aden Affairs from the Colonial Office to the
Foreign Office and launched a new set of political and constitutional talks. The
ministers leading these talks had not endeared themselves to any of the
parties in Aden, but especially the traditional rulers of the Western states and
their British advisers. The Government also launched a Defence Review
resulting in a decision to close the Aden military base and circumscribe the
defence commitment to the new state, to reduce costs. This was in clear
breach of earlier undertakings, which demoralised supporters of the
Federation. It was also inept to announce this decision at such a time as to induce Egypt to continue its military support to the Yemen and the contending
parties, rather than withdraw from Yemen. In the absence of a political
solution, efforts to limit the local conflict were unavailing.
When Sir Richard Turnbull was appointed High Commissioner, some of his
former colleagues and friends muttered about a 'poisoned chalice'. Whether
he considered it to be so, is not clear, but what perhaps he did not realise was
how limited his discretion would be. It is not surprising therefore that many
considered the manner of his removal from office in 1967 to have been
brusque and ungracious. He laboured long and hard to achieve a better
outcome, which was in the event unsuccessful, though the main responsibility
lay elsewhere - with the decisions taken in London. Eberlie could not fail to
have been touched by this outcome.
In summary, Eberlie has written a book which conveys much of the dynamic
and tension of the time he was in Aden. For the general reader his depiction of
the complexity and difficulty of the issues confronting Aden and its
government, the circumstances of life in Aden at that time and his description
of his part in the drama is vivid and convincing. It does not I think add a great
deal to the literature on the official history of Aden Colony and the two
Protectorates.
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