A book is long overdue about the events in 1964 which led eventually to the flight of
the six ministers of the Government of Malawi who opposed legislation put
forward by Dr Banda as Prime Minister in Parliament in a mammoth session on
8/9 September 1964. The issues were siting the University at Zomba, the location of the
new capital at Lilongwe, government housing, civil service salaries, charges for hospital
treatment, foreign policy (particularly recognition of Taiwan rather than the PRC),
Dr Banda's tending to regard Government as his personal property, failing to consult
Ministers and nepotism favouring John Tembo, nephew of the official hostess, Cecilia
Kadzimira; in other words, a range of issues on policy affecting democratic governance,
social and fiscal management, major development projects affecting regional balance
and distribution of power, and Malawi's alignment in the Cold War; a not inconsiderable
agenda facing a newly independent country. Colin Baker has produced a hefty volume of
324 pages dealing minutely, almost laboriously, with all the factors leading to the breach
between a well qualified group of Malawians who played leading roles in bringing an
expatriate Malawian more than twice their age back, after over 40 years, to the country
he left in his youth and in constructing for him the political base on which Malawi's
independence was achieved. Baker has obviously collected almost all the extant paper on the events he surveys and, during his colonial career in Nyasaland/Malawi, knew all the
principals in the drama. Most of them were, like Banda himself, prison graduates.
The book sketches the preceding events from Banda's return to the achievement of
independence, without however dealing with the break-up of the Central African
Federation covered in another of the author's detailed studies of Nyasaland. Perhaps the
most interesting subordinate issue dealt with is Chipembere's attempted coup in
February 1965 based on Mangochi, a forlorn attempt to rouse the country against Banda,
defeated as much by the incompetence of the plotters (ferry on the wrong side of the
Shire River) and lack of co-ordination with potential allies as by the lethargic counter
measures of the security forces. The involvement of the US Ambassador and CIA in
Chipembere's escape to America and the foreknowledge of it (if not participation) of the
British High Commissioner is confirmed by documentary evidence. The FCO's later
judgement that the attempt was "purely political", not sufficient cause ("flimsy grounds")
for having him prosecuted when he proposed to visit Britain, betrays an underlying
sympathy for Chipembere and his colleagues, as evinced when the Chirwas were
captured and imprisoned after their imprudent return to Malawi in 1982, as well as full
awareness of Banda's authoritarian excesses, the principal cause of the Revolt and of
subsequent internal crises (eg the imprisonment of Aleke Banda in 1980 and the state
murders of Dick Matenje, Aaron Gadama and others in 1983).
In preferring Banda the British Government backed stability and a degree of financial
propriety, as well as securing a base for action against UDI and the insulation of Malawi
from communist influences; Banda was rewarded with preferential aid which he
carefully protected from malversion while raiding his Treasury's other resources when
need arose for his own enterprises (the cause of the break with Aleke Banda). There was
probably no alternative; fear of Banda was pervasive and deep. It was only when
continued aid was made conditional on opening up democratic choice that his hold
slipped; even then he was protected from paying any substantial penalty for his excesses
by a meek and surprisingly compassionate people.
Baker's account deals fully with the relationship between Glyn Jones, the Governor-
General, and Banda; the latter played his cards, especially the Independence card, so
well that at times Glyn Jones appears more an accomplice than a restraining voice; he
allowed himself to be misled by Banda's pretence, for example, about contemplating
resignation after the Kuchawe Declaration from which the Revolt developed.
Although he draws so extensively on documentary evidence. Baker quotes little of the
Zomba Hansard record of 8/9 September 1964. It was, of course, doctored, but gives a
vivid impression of the dramatic course of those two days. I liked Peter Moxon's quoted
description of one of the tantrums during the debate: "It was like a wilful child denied
his bag of sweets;" and his comment, "The ex-ministers on the back bench sat looking
on impassively."
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