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What's in a name?
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One hundred and fifty years after the events of 1857, there is still great debate in what they should actually be called. The British authorities firmly regarded the event as a mutiny by large sections of the Bengal army. Indeed the British were fortunate that it was only the Bengal Army, with a few exceptions, the Bombay and Madras armies stayed remarkably quiescent. The British recognised that there were a number of fellow travellers who joined in and took advantage of the collapse of authority throughout Northern India, notably Ghazis and Gujars.
Post 1947 Indian Nationalists have thought to refer to the events as India's First Nationalist Uprising. It is clear why they would like to brand this event as a nationalist uprising. It was unusual in that it did attract Muslims and Hindus to the cause, but the event was clearly confined to Northern India in general and Bengal in particular.
The truth was obviously somewhere in between. Undoubtedly, the Bengal Army took the lead through their initial mutinies, but they quickly tried to politicise and widen the event through asking the last Mughal Emperor to reassert his claims and reestablish the old Mughal Empire. This did attract wider support but the old Emperor did not have the energy or the resources to fully take on the power of the British in India. The hoped for general Indian uprising never did take place and despite attempts to escalate the events through various atrocities and sieges, the British were able to reorganise their forces in the Indian sub-continent and slowly but surely reestablish their control over the Bengal and other affected areas. Therefore, you could claim to call these events a mutiny that escalated into a rebellion but it never did hit the hoped for nationalist uprising status. For the sake of convenience and familiarity, I will use the term mutiny throughout although with the understanding that it did escalate further.
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Causes
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Again, there is much debate into why the mutiny did break out in India in 1857. For generations, British schoolboys and girls were told that it all had to do with a misunderstanding and mistakes over a new kind of cartridge issued to the Sepoys and Sowars. Indians were told that 1857 was the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Plassey and that British rule would come to an end on that date. These events certainly did occur and were significant in their own right. However the causes of the mutiny were far more varied and interconnected with one another in quite unforeseen and complicated manners.
Religion
The common thread that will tie most of the factors together and bringing an unlikely alliance between the Muslims and Hindus was the perceived threat to the native religions of the Indian sub-continent. The threat was the increased religious overtones of the East India Company and of the Europeans operating in the sub-continent. In the eighteenth century, the East India Company had been interested only in profit and commercial areas. As the nineteenth century progressed, religion began to play a more important role. Consequently, East India personnel took more interest in religious affairs and allowed more missionary work to be carried out under their aegis. This increased religiousity did not make much of a direct impact in terms of converts, but it was certainly noticed by a growing percentage of the Indian population and definitely by the East India Company's employees the sowars and sepoys. Indeed, more and more EIC officers were making unsubtle attempts to expose their soldiers to Christian teachings.
Losing Touch
In fact, the East India Company Officers had had a good reputation for mucking in with their soldiers and were known to lead from the front. In the eighteenth century, EIC officers had been real swashbucklers keen to make their fortune at whatever personal cost. They frequently underwent the same privations and dangers as their charges did. This earned the respect and awe of many Indian company soldiers. As time went on, newer generations of EIC officers were not so hungry for success. There were more British officers for starters and so it was easy for them to stay within the company of like minded officers rather than with their soldiers whose needs and wants they increasingly saw as foreign and peculiar. The officers' language skills consequently suffered which further took them out of the loop of understanding. When families started joining the officers, the break down in contact was almost complete. Officers were having to rely on their Indian NCOs who were very often as aggreived as the soldiers themselves.
Over-Confidence of EIC
Hand in hand with the loss of touch was the over confidence of the East India Company officials. They had become dangerously complacent about their own invincibility. Winning countless small battles at incredible odds had made the EIC seem impregnable. The fact that they were often using far better technology and were better organised only seemed to confirm their right to rule the sub-continent. Over the past century, the EIC had got side-tracked from making money from the ports of Calcutta and Bombay by supplying exotic goods to the people of Britain and the rest of the Empire. In fact scandal and corruption had already converted the East India Company from a trading company to a provider of government services. Ostensibly, this had been done to stamp out corruption and end the monopoly of the EIC over supplying goods. Actually, it would have the long term effect of changing the dynamics of EIC income. Their income would now come from direct taxation. The only ways to increase income was to increase taxation or to rule over an expanded empire. Neither of these methods would be popular with the Indian population. Whilst the company was making itself more unpopular in the areas it controlled, it would soon find that its armies were tied down in the newly conquered areas and their borders. The ratio of Europeans to Indians in the armed forces in the existing Indian Empire was reaching perilously low levels.
Dalhousie's Reforms
In 1848, James Ramsay, the Earl of Dalhousie, became Governor General of India. It was thought that he would represent a steadying influence on the colony and would control its budget. Dalhousie though attempted to spur on the modernisation and Europeanisation of the Colony. A department of Public Works was set up; telegraphs, railways, ports were all to be built or to be upgraded. The Ganges canal was to irrigate huge swathes of central India. Metalled roads were to be built. A postal system was set up. New engineering colleges were set up. Promotion was to be on merit rather than seniority. Tea plantations were encouraged and provided with the infrastructure to take away their products. He encouraged Christian missionaries and societies to provide missions to care for the needy and low caste Indians. These reforms, and many more, were intended to improve the efficiency of colony in the long run. The short term investment costs though would prove unpalatable and put yet more strain on the taxation system. He would also preside over the resurrection and implementation of the infamous 'doctrine of lapse' which will be expanded upon below. He retired due to ill health in 1856 - just before the mutiny - and was expecting a heroes welcome for his reforms but instead found himself having to defend himself against the charges of having stirred up the socio-economic structure of India to beyond breaking point.
Technology
EIC soldiers and other Indians would view many of the technological changes with trepidation. Steam trains and steam ships seemed to be some ungodly creature that defied the laws of nature. The new communications systems threatened many existing castes and businesses. Boatmen would be put out of the haulage business, farmers would find their local monopolies being challenged by cheaper imports from elsewhere in India or even further afield. Mass produced British made goods could be imported far more cheaply and efficiently than the locals could produce themselves. Severe strains were being placed on the existing economic systems by the very tools that were supposed to make India more efficient. Soldiers would have the added complication of new equipment and tactics to adapt to. With the expansion of the Indian Empire, soldiers were travelling further and further from their homes. Expeditions in Burma, the Middle East and further afield also required soldiers to travel over water. For high born Brahmins, this meant the loss of their caste. Technological change brought as many fears as benefits to the Indians in the 1850s.
The Doctrine of Lapse
Simply put, the doctrine of lapse allowed the company to annex the principality of any Indian ruler who died without natural heirs or one who was manifestly incompetent. It was thought that this would be a fairly painless way for the company to expand its Indian Empire (and therefore its tax base) by avoiding any direct confrontations or military annexations. It was hoped that the Indians did not really mind who their rulers were and would fatalistically live with the changes far above their heads. It was hoped that they would appreciate British efficiency and incorruptability. Satara was the first state to be annexed this way, Jaitpur, Sambalpur, Nagpur and Jhansi would follow suit. The practice of Indian princes adopting heirs was conveniently placed aside by Dalhousie. In 1856 the EIC would pick up the richest of the states in this manner. It was declared that the Oudh was being mismanaged by its incompetent ruler and so was annexed. Oudh was a very rich and probably corrupt Indian state but it was one that was understood and appreciated by its population. The British were thought of as inflexible and alien. It was also not appreciated just how large a proportion of the EIC sepoy army came from Oudh. They had been happy to take the King's shilling as any mercenary would, but many of them were horrified to find that their own homes had been annexed in such an underhand and unfair way.
Overstretch
The decade before the mutiny had been a busy decade for both the British and EIC armies. The British army had just been involved in the hugely complicated and disastrously run Crimean campaign from 1854 to 1856. Apart from the manpower costs of this campaign, it was hardly an advertisement to the world on the efficiency of the British Army. Many observers felt that the British might be a paper tiger after all. Azimullah Khan who would later advise the infamous Nana Sahib was just one such observer. He felt that the Turks or the Russians might provide better long term allies for the Indians. The EIC armies had been busy in 1848/9 in the annexation of Punjab and Sindh with the Anglo-Sikh Wars. There had been war in Burma and many smaller scale battles along the frontiers. The Santal Expedition had shown how even poorly equipped peasant armies could cause huge logistical problems for the EIC army. On top of all this was the stationing of the EIC armies in the newly acquired lands. This policy was thought prudent lest the newly acquired peoples rose up against their new masters. The EIC assumed that those areas it had ruled for decades or more were firmly under their control.
Cartridges
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| Enfield Paper Cartridge |
The infamous cartridge difficulties combined religious sensibilities with technological change. For years the EIC had relied on a simple but inaccurate smooth bore musket. It was decided to introduce a more accurate muzzle loading Enfield Rifled Musket. One way to speed up the loading process was the introduction of a paper cartridge with the bullet sitting on the exact quantity of powder needed. The loader was required to bite open this paper cartridge to expose the powder. The original cartridges were made in Britain and had been covered in tallow to help protect the cartridge from the elements. Unfortunately the tallow had been made from a beef and pork fat. To the British users of these cartridges, this made no big deal. Hindu and Muslim users were horrified at the defiling fat. The EIC quickly realised its blunder and replaced the animal fat with vegetable fat but the damage had already been done. To Hindus and Muslims alike, their worst fears of being ritually humiliated had been confirmed. Many assumed that this had been a deliberate policy by the Europeans who were looking to impose their own religion on the sub-continent. Battalion after battalion refused to use the new cartridges. Some even refused to handle the cartridges when officers had allowed them the option of tearing open the cartridges instead of biting them. As far as the officers were concerned, refusing to obey an order was tantamount to mutiny as it was. Different commanders handled the situation in different ways - some with more sensitivity than others. The first shots were to be fired by (an inebriated) Mungal Pandy on March 29th at Barrackpore. He protested against the disbanding of a unit that had disobeyed orders to use the cartridges. He shot at a British sergeant-major and a lieutenant and then engaged them in a sword fight. He saw the two of them off but then shot himself in the chest when General Hearsey arrived in the parade ground. The authorities at Barrackpore were forutunate to have the European 84th regiment to hand so that the disarming of the Indian battalions could be done with the threat of force for any sepoys thinking of refusing to hand over their guns. Not all stations would be so fortunate.
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1857 Map of India 1857 Map of Northern India
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| Significant Actors
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General Anson William Hodson
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| Sieges
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Cawnpore
Delhi
Lucknow
Arrah
Agra
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| Battles
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Badli-ki-Serai
Chinhat
1st Cawnpore
Unao
Bashirataganj
Bithur
Delhi
1st Lucknow
Agra
2nd Lucknow
2nd Cawnpore
3rd Cawnpore
Ruiya
Bareilly
Kotah-ki-Serai
Gwalior
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| Accounts
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Lt Mecham's Experiences at Lucknow
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| Timeline
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| 1857
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| Jan
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Problems in Dum Dum over greased cartridges
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Feb
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Mutinies at Barrackpore and Berhampore
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Mar
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Pande Executed
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Apr
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Unrest at Ambala, 48th Mutiny at Lucknow
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May 10
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Mutiny and Murders at Meerut
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May 11
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Europeans attacked in Delhi
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May 23
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Panic at Agra
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May 30
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Mutinies at Muttra and Lucknow
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May 31
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Bhurtpore Army mutinies
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June 5th
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Cawnpore 2nd Cavalry Mutinies
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June 6th
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Cawnpore Siege begins, Mutiny at Allahabad
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June 7th
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Wilson and Barnard meet at Alipur
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June 8th
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Battle of Badli-ki-Serai; Massacre at Jhansi
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June 11th
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Lucknow Police rebel; Neill arrives at Allahabad
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June 25th
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Nana Sahib offers terms at Cawnpore
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June 27th
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Massacre at Cawnpore
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June 30th
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Disaster at Chinhat; Lucknow Residency besieged
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July 1st
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Indore Mutiny
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July 2nd
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Arrival of Bakht Khan at Delhi
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July 4th
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Sir Henry Lawrence dies at Lucknow
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July 5th
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General Barnard dies
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July 7th
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Havelock's force leaves for Cawnpore
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July 16th
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Nana Sahib defeated at first battle for Cawnpore
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July 27th
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Siege of Arrah starts
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July 29th
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Havelock's victory at Unao
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August 5th
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Havelock's victory at Bashiratganj
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August 13th
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Havelock withdrawal to Cawnpore
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August 14th
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John Nicholson arrives at Delhi Ridge
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August 16th
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Havelock victory at Bithur
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September 5th
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Sir James Outram's arrival at Cawnpore
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September 14th
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Assault on Delhi
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September 19th
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Havelock and Outram march to Lucknow
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September 20th
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Delhi captured
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September 21st
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William Hodson captures King
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September 22nd
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Hodson murders princes
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September 25th
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First relief of Lucknow
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October 10th
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Agra mutineers defeated
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November 9th
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Kavanagh escapes from Lucknow
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November 17th
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Second relief of Lucknow
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November 19th
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Women and children evacuated from Lucknow
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November 22nd
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British withdraw from Lucknow
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November 24th
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Death of Havelock
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November 28th
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Windham defeated at second battle of Cawnpore
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December 6th
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Tatya Tope defeated at third battle of Cawnpore
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1858
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January 6th
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Campbell reoccupies Fategarh
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March 2nd
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Campbell returns to Lucknow
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March 21st
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Last rebels removed from Lucknow
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April 3rd
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Jhansi captured and sacked
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April 15th
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Walpole defeated at Ruiya
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April 23rd
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Rose enters Kalpi
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May 5th
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Campbell victory at Bareilly
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June 5th
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Death of the Maulvi
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June 17th
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Battle of Kotah-ki-Serai, death of Rani of Jhansi
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June 19th
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Battle of Gwalior
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November 1st
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Royal Proclamation replacing East India Company with British Government
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1859
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March 29th
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Bahadur Shah found guilty
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April 18th
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Tatya Tope executed
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Suggested Reading
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Barthorp, M. J.
British Troops in the Indian Mutiny London, 1994
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Bonham, J
Oude in 1857: Some Memoirs of the Indian Mutiny London, 1928
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Cave-Browne, J
The Punjab and Delhi in 1857 Edinburgh, 1861
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Dalrymple, William
The Last Mughal Bloomsbury, 2006
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Dangerfield, G
Bengaly Mutiny: the Story of the Sepoy Rebellion London, 1933
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Edwardes, M.
A Season in Hell London, 1973
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Edwardes, M.
Battles of the Indian Mutiny London, 1963
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Edwardes, M.
Red Year: The Indian Rebellion of 1857 London, 1973
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Featherstone, D
Victorian Colonial Warfare: India London, 1992
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Forbes-Mitchell, W
Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny London, 1895
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Grant, J
Incidents in the Sepoy War 1857 - 58 Edinburgh, 1873
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Griffiths, C.
Narrative of the Siege of Delhi London, 1910
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Gubbins, M.
An account of the Mutiny in Oudh and of the Siege of the Lucknow Residency London, 1858
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Gupta, P
Nana Sahib and the Rising at Cawnpore Oxford, 1963
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Harris, J
The Indian Mutiny London, 1973
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Hibbert, Christopher
The Great Mutiny - India 1857 Penguin, 1978
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Hilton, R
The Indian Mutiny: A Centenary History London, 1957
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Holmes, T. R.
History of the Indian Mutiny London, 1913
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Innes, M
Lucknow and Oude in the Mutiny London, 1896
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Kaye, J. W.
History of the Sepoy War in India 1857 - 58 London, 1864 - 67
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Leasor, J The Red Fort: An Account of the Siege of Delhi in 1857 London, 1956
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Llewellyn, A.
The Siege of Delhi London, 1977
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Lowe, T
Central India during the Rebellion of 1857 and 1858 London, 1860
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MacMunn, G
The Indian Mutiny in Perspective London, 1931
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Maunsell, F. R.
The Siege of Delhi London, 1912
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Muter, Elizabeth
My Recollections of the Sepoy Revolt
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Palmer, J.
The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut Cambridge, 1966
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Perkins, R.
The Kashmir Gate Chippenham, 1983
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Rowbotham, W.
The Naval Brigades in the Indian Mutiny 1857/8 London, 1947
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Russell, W. H.
The Naval Brigades in the Indian Mutiny London, 1957
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Sen, S.
Eighteen Fifty-Seven Delhi, 1957
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Stuart, V.
Battle for Lucknow London, 1975
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Trevelyan, G.
Cawnpore London, 1865
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Verney, G.
The Devil's Wind: the story of the Naval Brigade at Lucknow London, 1956
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Wood, E
The Revolt in Hindustan 1857 - 59 London, 1908
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