Many scholars have seen the building of New Delhi as India's new
capital city primarily as an assertion of British imperial supremacy. Its
architecture and design predominantly but not exclusively classical in
form has been interpreted as expressing a belief in the superiority of
European civilisation over that of previous empires, and the enduring
validity of British rule in India. in this new study of the archival record
of the deci ion to move the capital from Calcutta , and the salient
features of its architectural plan and design, David John on argues that
coercion should only be seen as half the story . The move to Delhi was
also intended as a symbol and promise of government by consent,
appealing to a conscious continuity with the traditions of previous
empires based in northern India, and implying a downplaying of the
primacy both of the commercial capital Calcutta and of Bengal, which
was perceived a a hotbed of intellectual dissent and revolutionary
aeticism. The proposed move was a bitter pill for the European
commercial community to swallow and they marshalled their
opposition to it with all the force of their powerful friends in London
and of the English language media. But the skilful package of changes
and concessions put together by the Viceroy Lord Hardinge included
the reversal of his predecessor Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal, a
move to delight the Bengali intelligentsia and to infuriate Curzon
himself and his influential coterie in the House of Lords. Ironically the
surprise decision itself had not been open to democratic discussion or
debate. Hardinge's trump card, as he believed, was that the
announcement was made by the King himself in all the pageantry of the
Delhi Durbar of 1911, the only such event in which a British King
Emperor or Queen Empress had been present in person. British prestige
was therefore seen to be at stake and the project could not have been
abandoned without a major loss of face.
The idea of government by consent was predicated not on any
substantial concession to nationalist demands, but in pursuit of a
gradualist programme with a measure of elective representation and
devolution of power to the provinces. The centre of power, embodied in
the new capital would continue to be imperial. The Council Chamber,
now the Parliament, was to embody the principle of government by
consent, with the quasi-independent princely states, free of nationalist
ambitions, accorded a prominent but largely ceremonial role.
What comes through in this book is the personal dominance of Lord
Hardinge in deciding how the move should be implemented. This
became clear in his effective interventions over the appointment of the
planning authority, the design engineers and the architects. Hardinge's
Viceregal tenure would end in 1916. He knew that unless the project
was pushed ahead quickly it would be open to his successor to cancel
the move. With a major war in Europe intervening, the project might
well have been abandoned on financial grounds alone. Had the major
buildings not already been above ground the fledgling project would
not even have been the 'magnificent ruin' that some cynics predicted
New Delhi would eventually become, as had all its predecessors.
The names of Lutyens and Baker share almost equal honours as the
architects of New Delhi. But Johnson's account restores the names of
others who were deeply influential in the planning debates even when
their ideas were not adopted. Though Hardinge favoured Lutyens as the
architect of Government House (later Viceroy's House and now
Rashtrapati Bhavan), Lutyens was open to criticism on other grounds
which were central to Hardinge's ideological concept of what the new
capital should represent. Lutyens had little regard for Indian
architecture which was allotted a largely decorative role, and that
through the advocacy of others. Hardinge admired the work of Bhai
Ram Singh of Lahore but it would have been good to have had more information than Johnson gives us about the Indian craftsmen who were
eventually involved. The gradient of Kingsway (now Rajpath), between
the two Secretariat buildings which housed the bureaucracy, was the
subject of a stand-off between Baker and Lutyens which Baker - with
Hardinge's still support - won. Lutyens himself wryly described it as
his 'Bakerloo'.
More fundamental than the individuals were the conceptual issues
raised; the relationship and share of accommodation for the Indian and
European staff; the scale and proportions of the public buildings in
relation to the old cities of Delhi and to the new city's ceremonial
space; and later the memorial to soldiers killed in the war that was
fought as the new capital was being built. After 1918 the design of war
memorials in Britain and across Europe became Lutyens's
acknowledged forte. His All India War Memorial - now India Gate -
was intended to symbolise a universal sense of loss and sacrifice by
both British and Indian soldiers. It commemorated a battle for
freedom, but not the freedom that after 1947 Indians wanted to
celebrate, namely their own.
After Indian independence much of the symbolism of Indian's capital
city had to be re-imagined. The city itself changed beyond recognition
with the massive influx of refugees from Partition, and especially the
division of Punjab between India and Pakistan. It has expanded
exponentially, spawning new suburbs and satellite cities, and a host of
new environmental problems. But New Delhi remains a place of
national pride and real power, and this skilfully told story of its origins
sheds light on the reasons why.
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