When I was at Sandhurst, many many moons ago now,
the Directing Staff was very keen that I, and my fellow
cadets, should learn and understand the Principles of
War. Even then it struck me that I was unlikely to
have to put them into practice for many years, if at all.
Knowledge of them seemed more appropriate to the
Commander in Chief of an army than to me, whose
only ambition at the time, was to command a platoon
in the Regiment of my choice. It seemed to me then,
and still does, that it would have been more useful to
teach us the Principles of Battle. But a theoretical
approach to training was symptomatic of War Office
thinking at a time before the Second World War: the Ten Year Rule, enunciated
by the politicians, had lulled the Army Council into
the belief that the war to end war had achieved its
object: Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the
Civil Power were to be our lot. Yet it was in these little
actions all over the Empire that comparatively junior
commanders were called upon to deal with situations
which were never studied at the Royal Military
College.
In those days it was India and its North West
Frontier that acted as a magnet to our imagination. So
when I joined a battalion that had won undying glory
and come near to annihilation in the Second Afghan
War, I learnt as much as I could about the operations
of the South Afghanistan Field Force in 1878 to 1880.
I had no access to source materials and could only
rely on official histories and the memory of the few
survivors whom I chanced to meet. One in particular
I remember well, an old man who had been a private
soldier in the Regiment and had settled in Egypt,
where he was butler and major domo to a retired
official of the Indian Civil Service. A recently published
and very readable book ("My God - Maiwand!") which has just come
into my hands reminds me, not only, of the old man's
reminiscences but also reinforces my opinion that the
Principles of Battle should have been included in the
instruction of potential officers. In the Kandahar
campaign every possible mistake was made and
Burrows' Brigade was defeated with heavy loss
althoug h in ex-private Nunn's opinion "it didn't
oughter have happened at all. We'd got them Paythans
licked."
This article is written with the advantage of hindsight,
in comfort and without stress, without any
feeling of smug superiority but in all humility to
suggest some guide-lines to junior officers who, in the
event of nuclear war, may well find themselves cut off
from their own formation and commanding a mixed
force in the face of a numerically superior enemy. It
does not pretend to be a review of Colonel Leigh
Maxwell's book, which tells the whole story of the
activities of the South Afghanistan Field Force from
the start of hostilities until Sir Frederick Roberts'
battle of Kandahar put an end to Sirdar Ayoub
Khan's pretensions. In order not to disrupt the
narrative my observations are confined to an appendix
cross-referenced in the text.
Brigadier General Burrows consisted of a cavalry
Brigade (3rd Sind Horse, 3rd Queen's Own Bombay
Light Horse and E Battery of B Brigade RHA) under
command of Brigadier General Nuttall, and Burrows'
own infantry Brigade (HM 66th Foot less two companies,
1st Bombay Native Infantry (grenadiers), the
30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) and a
company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners)1. This
made up a fighting strength of one thousand eight
hundred bayonets five hundred and fifty sabres and
six 9-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns. Its task was
to support the army of Wali Sher Ali Khan who was
marching against the Sirdar Ayoub Khan, Governor
of Herat.
The troops left Kandahar on 4 July 1880 and reached
the East bank of the Helmand river, eighty
miles away, a week later. A few days afterwards, most
of Sher Ali Khan's army mutinied and set off Northwards
up the West bank, dragging their smooth bore
artillery with them. The column commander realised
that it was vital to get at the mutineers with the
utmost speed but he had encamped in a defensive
position where the Helmand River was deep and
unfordable. Instead of sacrificing a little time to get
his command across the river as a cohesive formation,
he committed it to action piecemeal as each squadron could find its way across a difficult ford. Nevertheless,
the action was successful, the six guns captured and
the infantry put to flight after a bayonet charge by a
half company of HM 66th Foot, who had "stormed their .
way into a walled garden where they shot or bayoneted the
defenders".
Perhaps this easy victory made Burrows overconfident.
He appears to have overlooked the fact that
Jacob's Rifles, largely recruits, had shown strong
signs of lack of training and discipline by firing a wild
and irregular fusilade without orders at an enemy
already far out of shot. This may also have been the
reason that, as the mutineers had escaped with their
artillery horses, he ordered that some of the captured
"ammunition wagons should be burned and that all the
ammunition except for fifty-two rounds per gun for each of the
six pieces should be thrown into a deep hole in the river . ...
No thought appears to have been given to making some use of
the fifty camels captured at the same time, nor of loading the
infantry with one round a man"2
Burrows was now faced with a difficult decision. He
could not stay where he was because the supplies
collected in Girishk for his use by the Wali had been
spirited away by the mutineers. If he moved North to
Haidarabad, where there were said to be ample
supplies, he would leave the road to Kandahar open.
If he fell back on Kandahar, there would be nothing
to stop the Sirdar marching on Kabul. He compromised
by withdrawing about half way to base but could
not decide where to make his camp. He moved it three
times before deciding on a walled enclosure on the
Khushk-i-Nakhud river where "he concentrated his one
hundred and thirty sick, the stores and the baggage animals".3
He now received the following order: "You will
understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayoub if you
consider you are strong enough to do so. Government considers
it of the greatest political importance that his force should be
dispersed and be prevented by all possible means from passing
on to Ghazni."
Although Burrows had with him an excellent
Intelligence organisation of three "political" officers
as vvell as two cavalry regiments, whose patrols at
troop strength would be safe from any desultory
attack, he had no idea of Ayoub Khan's intentions.
His patrol plan was faulty: "no permanent outposts were
manned: the daily patrols, instead of relieving each other,
returned to camp; the same roads were followed, the same times
observed". As the country people were hostile they had
no difficulty in avoiding the cavalry which brought
little or no information into the British camp.4
Moreover he made no use of the heliograph although
it was available in Kandahar and was used successfully
~he following year from thence to Maiwand.5
On the evening of 25 July information reached
Burrows that the Sirdar had reached Haidarabad and
expected to move to Maiwand, fifteen miles away, on
the 27th. Burrows did nothing on the 26th except to
call an inconclusive council of war. It was not until
half past teh at night that he woke his commanding
officers with an order to attack Maiwand next morning.
6 Further rest was impossible; the remainder of the
night was spent in packing up and in loading the
transport animals. The gunners, HM 66th Foot and
the cavalry seem to have been fed before dawn, but
the Indian infantry got nothing. Even the water
bottles, normally filled from wells outside the camp
perimeter, were in many cases empty and the sepoys
left the camp thirsty to march and fight in the blazing
heat of an Afghan summer day.7
Although they had been working since midnight it
was not until 7 o'clock that the head of the infantry
column left camp, protected from surprise by the
cavalry on all sides. HM 66th Foot had been ordered
to detach one company as baggage guard and- were
finding one officer and forty-two men, who had been
hastily trained as gunners, to man the captured
smooth bore battery. The two NI Regiments were also
detailed to find a company each as baggage guard and
were further depleted by having to provide detachments
of forty men of the Rifles for the Commissariat,
fifty Grenadiers to guard the ordnance stores and a
further twenty-five as escort for the Treasury, and
General Burrows' personal baggage.8
Only an hour had passed when the first halt had to
be called to allow the baggage animals to catch up.
This was repeated at Mashak where some officers had
breakfast, and men and horses watered. Only the
sepoys of the Grenadiers were not allowed to leave their positions to fill their water bottles. Then came
information that Afghan horsemen were moving
across the column's front and that their cavalry had
reached Maiwand.
The object of Burrows' sortie had been to cut
Ayoub's line of march and prevent him from reaching
Ghazni by holding Maiwand. This was now clearly
impossible and it seems that his plan was to occupy
the village of Mundabad, prepare it for all round
defence and lure the Sirdar to attack him there. In the
event, possibly due to a misunderstanding of orders,
or perhaps in their absence, the cavalry and artillery
advanced some one thousand five hundred yards
North West of the village across a deep ravine which
was later used as a covered approach by the enemy.
Shortly afterwards they were joined by the infantry.
The baggage and baggage guard was left about two
miles back but without any orders.9 Burrows himself
came forward and sa~ that his artillery had succeeded
in turning the Afghan army from its line of march in
order to attack him, but he had not reconnoitred the
Mundabad area and had not arranged for anyone else
to do so. He decided to stand and fight where he was.
The plain to his front appeared flat and featureless.
He ignored a cavalry report that there was a ravine
two or three hundred yards ahead of him. 10
Meanwhile Ayoub Khan had seen how small was
the force before him and decided to surround it with
his cavalry and then attack it from all sides at once.
The battle began shortly before 11 o'clock when our
artillery opened fire on any target that appeared, but
with little effect. The heat haze and the dust made
accurate observation difficult. "For half an hour the
Afghans fired nothing in return, employing the time in closing
up the regular infantry and bringing the artillery forward from
the rear. The batteries moved up slowly and carefully, making
good use of every rise and dip in the ground to conceal their
approach, which was masked not only by dust and haze, but
also by the journeyings hither and thither of the rest of their
army. At a quarter past eleven they were in action, for the most
part unseen by the British." It was not until an hour later
that Burrows formed his infantry into position. Until
then they had been lying down behind the guns. Only
the Sappers and Miners had dug themselves in,
presumably as only they had the means to do so.
At noon Burrows' force was disposed as follows: On
the right were four companies of HM 66th facing East
with a dry water course in front of them. The Horse
Artillery, protected by the Sappers and Miners,
prolonged their line Northwards. Behind them one
wing of Jacob's Rifles faced North; the other was two
hundred yards in their rear. On their left and slightly
forward of them were the Grenadiers, also facing
North. Slade's smooth bore battery was on their right
in front of the Rifles. Left flank protection was
provided by a squadron and a troop of the Sind Horse
in a dismounted role.11
The first Afghan attack was by the fanatical Ghazis
against HM 66th, which met it with controlled fire by
companies which halted even these dedicated warriors.
Some sought cover and some edged to their left,
overlapping the right of the British line. Colonel
Galbraith threw back his right company to face this
fresh threat but it was clear that a new and more
determined attack was being prepared. Harris, the
DAQMG got permission from Burrows to move two
of the 6 pdrs to strengthen the 66th line. When the
Afghans did attack they were "met with a shattering fury
of Martini Henry and artillery fire which swept them from
their feet and drove them helter skelter back whence they had
come".
Ayoub now threatened a right hook: two or three
thousand horsemen swung round the left of the
Grenadiers, who in turn refused their flank. The
attack did not develop. At the same time, although
there was no immediate threat anywhere, Burrows
ordered the rear wing of Jacob's Rifles to send two
companies to prolong the line of the 66th Foot on his
right and two to do the same for the Grenadiers on the
left. He had thus split the Rifles into three parties: one
was on each flank and one was left in the centre
separated from their comrades by HM 66th and the
Grenadiers. Also he had, thus early in the day,
committed his only reserve.12
Whilst Burrows was trying to strengthen his line,
Ayoub was moving up his artillery and infantry under
cover to get into position for the kill.
"Burrows knew better than to wait for them to complete their preparations". He ordered the Grenadiers to advance
in line for five hundred yards. They had only
been on the move for a few minutes when the
concealed Afghan artillery opened up from half the
distance at which they had previously been in action.
In fact the guns were ill-aimed and the casualties few,
but, like many other brave men, Burrows was more
careful of his soldiers' lives than his own: he ordered
the Grenadiers to halt and take cover, thereby losing
their momentum and surrendering the initiative to the
enemy.13Regular Herati infantry now mounted an
attack on them, but the storm of controlled rifle fire
and relentless shelling was too much for them. They
broke and fled . It was with difficulty that they could
be made to re-form and move round the British left
flank to support their supine cavalry. Burrows, up in
front as usual, saw the threat and ordered the left
flank companies of Jacob's Rifles to fall back to fill the
gap in his line left by the advance of the Grenadiers.
These companies, largely untrained recruits, commanded
by Cole, a twenty-one-year-old subaltern
who had only been with the Regiment for two months,
"started for the rear in such confusion that it was only due to
the efforts of the Force Commander that they were stopped and
got down into position". 14
The next attack came from the Kabuli infantry
regiments, who tried their luck against the main body
of the Rifles. They were made of sterner stuff than the
Herati's and when they were checked by fire "began to
crawl forward in extended order to form up under some
unsuspected cover closer to the British Line".
Whilst the column was everywhere holding its own,
and more, in front. Major Ready, commanding the
Baggage Guard, was dealing with loot-hungry
Afghans who had worked round his flanks. Detachments
of all three infantry regiments cleared the
enemy from the Mundabad ravine and occupied the
village. Colonel Malcolmson of the Sind Horse,
whether on Burrows' orders or not, we do not know,
ordered the successful detachments back to their
original positions and told Major Ready to retire the
leading baggage animals across the ravine. This
movement to the rear emboldened the enemy who
occupied Mundabad in greater strength than before
and caused panic among the camel drivers, many of
whom fled with their animals and left the remainder
"massed in utter confusion from which it was almost
impossible to extricate them".
The crisis of the battle came just before one o'clock.
The British Force was disposed roughly in a horseshoe
formation in an open plain. Around them
swarm·ed the Afghan army. To their right rear were
the villages of Khig and Mundabad, surrounded by
walled gardens, which would have provided a good
defensive position and where water was available.
Also in the vicinity under cover were a quarter of a
million rounds of small arms ammunition and five
hundred rounds of shell and case for the 9-pounders of
the Horse Artillery. Between this haven of safety and
the British battle position was a mile of undefended
territory across which ammunition and water must
come, but was open to forays by the Afghan horse. 15
Burrows had two alternatives open to him: to risk a
withdrawal to Mundabad or to remain where he was
in the hope that the Afghan army would attack again
and once more be driven off by fire. He chose the
latter alternative, probably because he dared not risk
moving Cole's companies. What he did not realise
was that a deep dry watercourse wound parallel to the
British line, in some places only two hundred and fifty
yards in front of it, which was now filling with Afghan
guns, regular infantry and Ghazis. "Its banks are flush
with the plain and its course cannot be traced from the British
line even on a clear day".
At half-past-one the smooth bore battery ran out of
ammunition. Its commander, Slade, having sent
officers to the baggage lines to find his reserve of shells
without avail "took the extraordinary step of ordering his
whole battery to go back and collect it! "The effect of seeing
the British guns withdraw was disastrous to the
morale of the Indian troops and gave a tremendous
boost to that of the enemy.
It will be remembered that Burrows had under
command a cavalry Brigadier General, Nuttall, and
two regiments of horse. Some squadrons had been
used in a dismounted role to prolong the left of the
horseshoe, some were with the baggage guard and
some remained mounted under fire, awaiting orders which did not come. When one squadron commander
asked a staff officer to get orders from the Force
Commander he was told "that he could withdraw from
where he was and go to whichever flank needed him most. He
might have expected more specific order". 16
Nuttall saw some Ghazis who had infiltrated round
the right flank of HM 66th and ordered, or more
probably led, a squadron to charge and disperse
them. After a few hundred yards, he changed his mind
and ordered their return; he had remembered, or been
reminded, that there was a dry water course in his
path, deep enough to break up his charge.
This abortive charge further raised the enemy
morale. Their infantry and cavalry had overlapped
both horns of the British fighting line and penetrated
between it and the baggage park. Casualties were
mounting on both sides, but the Afghans could afford
them , the British could not. Moreover their rifles were
almost too hot to hold, their ammunition was nearly
exhausted and the blazing sun was beating down on
men, long since dehydrated from lack of water. Then
Ayoub ordered his guns to cease firing and his whole
army to charge home. Only HMs 66th could stem this
avalanche of fanatics. The two Native Infantry Regiments
broke. The gunners, bereft of their infantry
support, tried to save their guns but had to abandon
two of the 9-pounders.
Then the cavalry received orders to charge, but
once again Burrows' orders were vague and half the
cavalry went one way and half the other. Nuttall
appears to have given no orders at all. After a few
minutes, during which his manoeuvre had increased
the confusion behind the British right, he left the field,
with the portion of his regiments which he could
collect, in the direction of Mundabad.
The 66th Foot, their formation loosened by the
sepoys who had fled to find cover behind them,
required elbow room. They charged and dispersed the
Ghazis to their front but then veered to their right,
towards the village of Khig, where they would have
some protection behind the walls of the gardens and
would be nearer to the Baggage Guard and their own
reserve ammunition. They carried with them disorganised
elements of both the Rifles and the Grenadiers but were so exhausted after their march and the long fight in blistering heat that "both Europeans and
Indians were completely bemused". This state of shock did
not last long and they soon rallied to their officers and
withdrew in groups firing to such effect that the
enemy remained at a respectful distance. Colonel
Galbraith got the two rear companies into formation
and was joined by other men of the 66th and some of
the retreating NI. He made a stand on the East side of
the Mundabad Ravine North of Khig whilst those of
the 66th who had been worst disorganised by the
fleeting NI rallied under Colonel Mainwaring of the
Rifles and Beresford-Pierce of the 66th in Mundabad.
So the situation at 3 o'clock was that the bulk of the
66th Foot, with some of the NI and some Sappers and
Miners, were on the outskirts of Khig, some sepoys
retiring cross-country, Mainwaring's party in Mundabad,
the Baggage Guard holding its own still
further to the South; the cavalry reorganising behind
two batteries of artillery were further West, "squadrons
coming under the direct command of their own regimental
commanders for the first time that day"! The remainder of
the artillery was either out of ammunition and retiring
or in the hands of the enemy. At this moment Burrows
appeared in Mundabad and ordered a bugler to
sound the "Retire".17
An extract from Major Ready's report describes the
scene from the Baggage Guard: "I now saw numbers of
men - mostly sepoys - passing to our rear in twos and threes;
some of these men joined the baggage which was then retiring;
but the. majority made for the hills, looking, I presume, for
water. Captain Quarry's company covered the retreat in
skirmishing order and a few of the 1st and 30th Native
Infantry, with some other men whom I was able to collect, also
formed part of the general line. Captain Slade RHA now
called upon us to support him and came into action firing
several rounds with excellent effect. The enemy did not
maintain a vigorous pursuit. At about 5.30pm their guns
ceased firing, and after that I consider that the pursuit ended. "
It had indeed, and for two reasons. The first was that
practically the whole of the baggage of the Brigade,
scattered over the countryside, was an irresistible
temptation to the Afghan horse, who concentrated on
the loot and left the weary, thirsty infantry to struggle back to Kandahar. The second was the courage and
discipline displayed by HM 66th Foot and about forty
officers and men of the Bombay Presidency units .
Colonel Galbraith had about one hundred and ninety
men with the colours at his first stand, but casualties
came fast and he withdrew in good order, making two
further stands in the gardens. Their desperate resistance
held up the whole of Ayoub Khan's left and most
of his centre while Burrows' party got clear away.
T heir end is best described in the despatch sent by the
General Officer Commanding in Kandahar to the
Commander in Chief in India: "I have it on authority of a
Colonel of Artillery in Ayoub Khan's Army who was present
at the time, that a part of the 66tfzRegiment which he
estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most
determined stand. They were surrounded by the whole of the
Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven men were left,
inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. These eleven men
charged out of the garden and died with their faces to the foe,
fighting to the death; such was the nature of their charge and
the grandeur of their bearing, that, although the whole of the
Ghazis were assembled round them, not one dared approach to
cut them down. Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing
steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands,
these eleven officers and men died; and it was not until the last
man had been shot down that the Ghazis dared advance upon
them. He further adds that the conduct of these men was the
admiration of all who witnessed it. From an examination
of the ground, from corroborative evidence and from the position
in which the bodies were found, I have not the least hesitation
in stating that this is true; and I think that His Excellency
will agree with me when I say that history does not afford any
grander or finer instance of gallantry and devotion to Queen
and Country than that displayed by the 66th Regiment on the
27 July 1880."
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