After the first battle of Pollilur in 1780, the victor, Tipu Sultan,
instructed an artist to paint a mural on his palace walls to commemorate
the defeat of the East India Company' s Madras Army. It is an exciting
picture and copies still survive. The sepoys, smart in their white
trousers and red jackets, form a large square, the classic defensive
position of the time. Within the square, Colonel William Baillie sits in
his palanquin which has been placed on the ground. He seems unaware
that an enormous ammunition cart has just exploded, sending smoke
and flames into the air. In fact this was one of two carts that blew up
when they were hit by Tipu's famous iron-dad rockets, thus altering
the course of the battle, which had seemed, until then, to be going in the
Company' s favour. Baillie got out of his palanquin and reformed the
square with those soldiers who hadn't run away in fear. But in spite of a
gallant last stand, praised even by his enemies, Baillie was doomed. It
was his last day as a free man and in a little over two years he was to
die a terrible death in Tipu's palace dungeons at Seringapatam. It was
one of the most significant defeats for the Madras Army during the
Mysore wars, which blighted southern India for almost fort y years.
Doubts were raised at home over w hether the Compan y could hold on
to its possessions in India.
Had the ammunition carts not exploded, then the tactical errors that
preceded the battle would have been brushed aside. General Sir Hector
Munro, former Commander-in-Chief, seems to have been one of the
main culprits, not only for his failure to join Colonel Baillie's brigade
column, as originally intended, but then by sending Colonel Fletcher
and his men as substitutes. 'All the General's errors arose from an
indistinctness of judgement and a facility to be misled by designing
men' wrote a contemporary critic. Also to blame, in the author's eyes,
are the French, both individually, as mercenaries in Tipu's army, and
collectively, as a nation. Wars between England and France during the
late eighteenth century meant, by extension, that they also had to be
fought in India between English and French settlements there. Both
countries were also keen to lend their fledgling, but superior, armies to
local rulers, with the result that nawabs and rajas saw Europeans, in
their employ, fighting each other, as happened at Pollilur.
The author, Alan Tritton, has a personal interest in the life of William
Baillie, because he is a direct descendant of Baillie's brother John.
Three years ago he went with family members to a rededication service
at the handsome memorial built at Seringapatam to William Baillie.
This was erected in 1816 by Baillie's nephew, another John, who was
then British Resident in Lucknow. The memorial has been expertly
restored with funds from donors, including BACSA. There are many
interesting themes in this book, particularly the discovery in two
Scottish archives, of previously unpublished letters to, and from,
William Baillie. The preliminary chapters give a useful insight into
why so many Scottish younger sons went to seek their fortunes abroad
- the 1707 Act of Union meant they could seek army commissions to
fight abroad in the rapidly expanding British empire. William's
intention was to make enough money in India to support his family and
its estate at Dunain, which was by no means wealthy. In this he was
disappointed, because his regiments, the 89th (Highland) and
subsequently the Company's 4th Carnatic Battalion, were not involved
in any major conquests, which meant there was no prize money to share
out and send home. His longing to return to Scotland is clear in his
letters, but after twenty years soldiering his only reward was a prison
cell in India and death. There are a few editing errors in this book and
the index is rather inadequate, but William's story is highly and warmly
recommended for the general, as well as specialist reader.
Refreshingly, there are no footnotes at all, but discursive and elegant
chapter headings in the eighteenth century manner.
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